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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
G1\R'rH SEEGand i\IARJORIE SEEG-

\'.' l L L I .(\
~Ill.JLEI\

~1

:\IILLER, dba ~l1\DJ1:~IOISEI.JL}~
B 1•: . \.U'l'\~ SALON, or l\Ir\D~~ ~101SELLE SALONE OF, BEAlJ'fY,
Plaintiffs-AppellantsJ

Case No.
9933

vs .
.\

l~

II UN T,

SELLE

dba

MADEl\101-

l~OIFFURES,

Defenda~nt-Rcspondcnt.

Defendant-Respondent's Brief

Sl'A'l'E)l~~N'l'

OF N r\ TURE OF CASE

'rhis is a case involving the common law of tradetnarks. tradenames, and unfair competition; and also
the lTtah Statute applicable to trademarks and tradenatnes (Title 70. Utah Code Annotated).
Plaintiffs began using name "Mademoiselle Salon of Beauty" to identify a beauty salon in Provo,
1
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Utah, in May, 1959, and became known in Utah County
by that· name prior to June 2, 1961. (Stipulation R. 8)
Defendant,. without knowledge of Plaintiffs' na1ne
or use, began using name "Mademoiselle Coiffures" to
identify his beauty salon in a wholly different geographic
market, namely Ogden, Utah, about April 1, 1961, and
became known by that name by many customers in
'Veber County and North Davis County prior to June
2, 1961. (Stipulation R. 8)
Plaintiff, Wm. Garth Seeg1niller, with prior knowledge of Defendant's use of name "Mademoiselle Coiffures" on June 2, 1961, applied to register his trademark
with Secretary of State and verified that no one other
than plaintiff had a right to use the name "lVIademoiselle" for a beauty salon "within the state of Utah."
Based on said verification the Secretary of State issued
a purported registration.
Subsequently, Plaintiffs brought action to enjoin
Defendant's use of "Mademoiselle" in its name, based
on Plaintiffs' June 2, 1961, registration. Defendant
counterclaimed for costs and damages, to set aside Plaintiffs' purported registration, and to restrain harassment
by Plaintiffs.
The trial court considered evidence as to registration and common-law rights of respective parties to use
name "Mademoiselle," and required written briefs.
On subsequent motion of Plaintiffs, after filing of
briefs by each party, the court permitted Plaintiffs to
reopen and present further evidence ('fr. 75-196).

2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. . \fter trial \vithout jury the l'ourt found as facts

that he<.'ause of ditf('rence in geographic "',.frade .~\.rea"
there ,\.:ts no eon1petition or confusion; that defendant
adopted its ruune \vithout kno,vledge of Plaintiffs' use
or narne; that Defendant's use prior to June 2, 1961,
lun·ing becorne established and not abandoned, Plaintiffs'
suhsc<luent registration \vas invalid. The court denied
relief to J>laintiffs, declared Plaintiffs' registration in,·:tlid, and ordered each party to pay its respective costs.

ltELIEl1"' SOUGH'!, ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the judgment, except that Defendant cross-appealed for reversal as to
l)efendant paying its own costs; and seeks a ruling that
I>Iaintifi's are responsible for costs and damages suffered
by Defendant. l:>laintiffs seek reversal of entire judgment.

Plaintiffs con1n1enced operating a beauty salon in
I>rovo, lTtah, in 1946 (,.l"'r. 28, 142) under name "Marjorie's Salon of Beauty." On ~lay 23, 1959, Plaintiffs
opened an additional shop in Provo using name "~Iade
llloiselle- Salon of Beauty" (Tr. 9, 2~, Exhibit "J").

11'laintiffs assert extensive advertising coverage not
sho,\·n by evidence ( Br. 3) . Plaintiffs' advertising

3
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alleged to go northward beyond Utah County prior to
June 2, 1961, was limited to a beauty show at ti1ne of
opening in May, 1959, on KLOR T'T (Tr. 88, 159),
and a radio ad on a 5000-watt station June 5, 1959 (Tr.
26, Exhibit "L"). Plaintiffs' evidence (Exhibit "F ,"
addendum 2, prospectus 4) clearly establishes impossibility of KLOR transmitting to Salt Lake City or
Ogden, until later in June, 1959, when transmitter
power was increased. This evidence was offered to show
coverage May 23, 1959 (Tr. 159}.
No evidence whatsoever was offered as to any circulation of the Daily Herald of Provo beyond Utah
County, ( Tr. 14, Exhibit "E"), and in any case only
one ad is claimed, September 1959. Cancelled check to
Daily Herald in summer, 1960, did not identify nature
or date of service rendered (Exhibit "M," 'fr. 25), and
was not offered in evidence.
As to advertising in the "B.Y.U. Universe" the
only ads were in nlid-1959 ('.fr. 14, 15), and the only
evidence admitted by the court as to circulation limited
circulation to current B.Y.U. students and local townspeople ( Tr. 16).
Plaintiffs' trade area for transactions under name
''Mademoiselle'' did not extend northward beyond Salt
Lake City and probably not beyond ·utah County on
June 2, 1961. Plaintiffs were not known by that name
to northern Utah customers on that date. (Tr. 89, 134,
160-170). Only two customers were actually living north
of Utah County on June 2, 1961. ('l"r. 93, 34). Leone

4
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Boothe of Brigluun (, ity began going to )larjorie SeegrniUer "·hile living in I>rovo 18 years ago, and still goes
to her front tirue to tinte \vhile passing through Provo.
und hns ~larjorie herself do her hair. (Tr. 92, 93). This
goo<hrill \\'as long ago established 'vith ~larjorie personally. and is not related or identified 'vith the tradename
H~ladernoiselle.'' ('fr. U~). 'fhe other is Lettie B. Hust
of ()gden ( anyon ,,·ho works with ~Ir. Seegmiller daily
at llercules Po,vder l . . o. in Salt Lake County, and whose
trade has consisted solely of a few beauty product purehases bought fro1n and delivered personally to her by
plaintiff in Salt Lake l,ounty ( Tr. 34, 76-79). Other
alleged eustomers did not reside in northern Utah as
early as J unc 2. 1961. ('l.,r. 89, 134, 160-170). Plaintiffs
could identify no additional "customers" notwithstandillg a "cotnplete card file'' on all customers describing
nan1e. address and service rendered ( Tr. 144) ; and not,,·ithstanding opportunity to reopen and present new
evidence after trial briefs (Tr. 75).
1

Defendant began using name "Mademoiselle Coiffures'' about ..:\pril 1, 1961 (Tr. 41), and has used it
continuously to present tin1e (Tr. 39-47). Prior to
. :\pril 1. 1961, Defendant procured printed checks and
other n1aterials and ordered sign (Exhibit 7, Tr. 40, 41).
Defendant paid Ogden City for license April 12, 1961
(Exhibit 10, 'fr. 51) and Defendant paid State of Utah
for a license . .-\pril14, 1961 (Exhibit 9, Tr. 50). Defendant opened for business May 19, 1961, accompanied
by and preceeded by extensive newspaper and radio
advertising (Exhibits 3, 4, 5, Tr. 42-46) .

5
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Defendant becan1e known by the name "~Iadeinoi
selle Coiffures" by many customers in Weber and north
Davis Counties prior to June 2, 1961. (Stipulations R.
8, No.5.)
Defendant did not know of Plaintiffs' business at
the time of adopting Defendant's name or at any other
time prior to development of Defendant's good will and
identification ( Tr. 41, 42, 51, 97, 184, 185, 186), and the
trier of fact, the Court, has so held ( R. 12, 14) . Allegations of plaintiffs to the contrary are not supported by
evidence ( Tr. 41, 42, 51, 97, 184, 185, 186).
No actual confusion between Plaintiffs and Defendant has ever resulted. (Tr. 33}
Plaintiffs have not contemplated a future expansion
into Defendant's trade area (Tr. 176, 177). Plaintiffs
have conducted no mail order business (Tr. 17, 79, 80,
169), and certainly none prior to June 2, 1961.
On June 2, 1961, Plaintiff, Wm. Garth Seegmiller,
filed his affidavit with the Secretary of State, requesting
a tra~ename registration (Exhibit 2). Such affidavit
verified on oath that ". . . no other person has a right to
use such trademark ... in the State of Utah" (Exhibit
2). That at the time of such filing, and prior to June 2,
1961, Plaintiffs knew of Defendant's business and use
of the name "Mademoiselle" (Tr. 30, 73, 74, 75, 179,
186). '"l,hat Plaintiff filed his affidavit specifically to
interfere with Defendant's use of name "Mademoiselle"
(Tr. 75). That the affidaYit '\\ras false in that defendant
6
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bad previously bccoill<' identified by his trade n~une
":\laderlloisellc l oifl'ures·' in \\rebcr C'ounty and north
l>a,·is l'ounty (Stipulation It. H, Xo. ;3) and the court
so detcrrnined as a q ucstion of fact. ( 1{. 12, 14)
1

'rite l'ourt found as facts that because of the differelll'l' in Htrade areas" there \vas no competition or confusion~ thnt Defendant adopted its name without knowledge of lllaintiffs' use of name. 'l"hat Defendant's use
prior to June 2, 1961, having become established and
not abandoned, I>laintiffs' subsequent registration was
invalid. (R. 12, 14)
'l'he l'ourt denied Plaintiffs' petition and granted
judgtnent to Defendant; except that the Court erred
in ordering defendant to pay its own costs and from this
decision, Defendant cross-appeals.

ARGU~IENT

I
lry·· REASON O:F' PRIORITY OF ADOP'flt)X AXD lTSE, PLAINTIFFS ARE THE
CO)l:\IOX
LA ''r
O''rNERS
IN
UTAH
l.,OlTX'"fY OF THE 'fRADENAME "MADE)lOISELLE'' AS .t\.PPLIES TO HAIR S'fYLlXG SPR..:\ \T. C.OS)IETICS .L-\XD TO BEAUTY
S..:\LOX S. SI)IIL.L-\RL Y BY REASON 0~_,
I>J{IORITY OF ADOPTIO~ AND USE IN
.\ "S}:J>..c-\.R~-\TE :\IARKET," DEFEXDANT
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IS THE CO~IMON -LA \V 0\\rNER IN WEBER
COUN'TY AND NOR'l"H DAVIS COUN'fi'
OF THE NAME "1\lADEMOISELLE" AS
APPLIES TO BEAUTY SALONS.
A.

Acquisitions of Basic Rights

Plaintiffs and Defendant each contend that the
basic law as to acquisition of common-law rights and
geographical scope is set forth.in Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, ( 1916), and United Drug
Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, ( 1918), and Sweet
Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, 15 F 2d 920 (CCA 8,
1926).
The adoption by Defendant of the name "1\lademoiselle Coiffures" after proper licensing, and expending considerable sums in mass advertising, and without
knowledge of Plaintiffs' use in a different trade area,
and Defendant having become identified by that name
in its "trade area" prior to June 2, 1961 (Stipulation
R. 8, No. 5) , and having continued such use to the present time, established a common-law right to the name
in Defendant for Weber and north Davis Counties.
"Undoubtedly, the general rule is that as between conflicting claimants to the right to use
the same mark, priority of appropriation determines the question."
United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co.
248 u s 90, 100 (1918)

8
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B.

'l'erritorial t.:ousidcratJoHs
1.

(;enerally

It is \\'ell re<.'ognized that such a right has territorial
lintit~. 'l'hus. it ''"as held in the S\veet Sixteen case, citing
\vith approval both the United Drug Co. and Ilanover
~tar ~Iilling cases. that:
"l\>nfessedly the general rule is that, 'vhile
the first appropriator and user of a trademark
O\vns such tnark . . . such protection will not be
afforded as against a subsequent user and appropriator. "·ho in good faith adopts and uses
the tnark in a territory into which the goods of
the first appropriator have not penetrated."
s,veet Sixteen C'o. v. Sweet "16'' Shop,
15 }_, 2<1 920, P. 923, (CCA 8, 1926)
2. Exceptions

'fhe court in that case went on (p. 924) to cite the
t'vo exceptions to the a hove rule, namely:
.. (a) llut 'vhere t\vo parties independently are
etnploying the same mark upon goods of the same
class. but in separate markets wholly remote the
one frotn the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant, unless at least it
appear that the second adopter has selected the
tnark 'vith sotne design inimical to the interests
of the first user. such as to take the benefit of
the reputation of his goods, to forestall the extens ion of his trade, or the like." United Drug
v. Rectanus, 2~8 lJ S 90, 101.
·· (b) ,,. . e are not dealing with a case where the
junior appropriator of a trademark is occupying

9
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territory that would probably be reached by the
prior user in the natural expansion of his trade,
and need pass no judgment upon such a case."
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U S
403, 420.

Certainly the case at bar does not fall within "exception (a)," because the trier of fact has determined
from the evidence that Defendant had no knowledge
of Plaintiffs' use ( R. 12, 14) , so couldn't have had a
"free ride" or use in mind inimical to best interests of
Plaintiffs.
What constitutes "separate markets" is a prime
factor in determining these cases. Thus, 3 Restatement
of Torts defined market in comments under Para. 717 as
follows:
"d. Limitation as to goods and market:
One who has a trade mark or trade name does
not have the exclusive right to use the designation
even as a trade mark or trade name. He has the
exclusive right only within 1nore or less restricted
markets. . . ." ( p. 567)
"e. Market.
The noun "market" means, initially, the territorial area in which goods are bought and sold, or
the gathering of persons in such an area for the
purpose of buying or selling goods .... " (p. 567)
Subsequently in Para. 732 the Restate1nent says:
Extent of protection with reference to
territorial1narkets.
"732

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'l'he interest in a trade n1ark or trade natne is
protel'ted. under the rule stated in 717, with reference onlv to 'l'erritorv from '\vhich he received or,
\vith the. probable expansion of his business, may
reasonnhly expect to receiYe custom in the business in "·hich he uses his trade mark or trade
ruune, and in territory in which a similar designation is used for the purpose of forestalling the
expansion of his business. ( p. 604)
"Comment a.
'l'he territorial limits within which the right to
exclusive use of a trade mark or trade name exists
Ina v be narrower than the territorial limits of the
la ,,; that creates the right. Since the right is
created in order to avoid, or compensate for,
harm caused by the tnarketing of one's goods or
services as those of another, the right is limited
to the territory in which such harm is likely....
In each case the issue is whether, in the territory
in which the similar designation is used, there are
or are likely to be a considerable number of prospective purchasers of the goods or services in
connection "·ith \vhich the trade mark or trade
nan1e is used, \vho are likely to be misled by the
sitnilarity. On this issue the good or bad faith of
the alleged infringer is an important factor ... "
(p. 604)
'fhese sections emphasize the importance of the
nu lllbcr of potentially 1nisled customers, and the bad
faith of alleged infringer.
'!'he National Grocery Co. case is a leading case
defining "geographic market," and market of "future
probable expansion'' tnentioned as exception (b) in the
S\veet Sixteen case. In that case, two supermarket retail11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ers emphasized "National" in their respective natnes,
their nearest stores being 25 miles apart in New Jersey.
The State Court in 1924 refused to enjoin the latecomer
saying:
". . . 'fhe grievance is the single one already
mentioned, namely, the use of the word which the
complainant says it has pre-empted in the chain
store business in the state of New Jersey as
against the entire world .... Obviously, by force
of the definition of the kind of business in which
the parties are engaged, each store must draw its
trade from a small surrounding territory.... "
National Grocery Co. v. National Stores Corporation, 123 A. 740, 740 (New Jersey).
The Court continued:
" ... Surely in the great majority of business
enterprises, ... there is implied the hope, intention and design of constantly invading new territory.... It would be absurd to say that any such
intention should permit the pre-empting of the
use of the name at a place and time where such
a supposed business enterprise had no customers
or business, and therefore nothing to lose. It is
entirely too remote and fanciful for the complainant to object to another using a name in a certain
locality, not because he has already established
his trade there, but because he may do so in the
future .... " (p. 743)
The Court then distinguished cases reaching contrary result:
" ... In all of the cases which the Vice Chancellor used as precedents (Hilton Case) the out-
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standing fact .... ,,·as the stealing by Defendant
of contplainants custon1ers." ( p. 7 43)
'fhe dictu111 of the l~ tah Supre1ne Court in the Blue
Bell east.• ei les United Drug Co. Y. Rectanus, and then
sets forth a sitnilar doctrine as Utah La'v in refusing
to recognize tnarket of future expansion:
··'rhe adoption of a trade mark does not project
a right of protection in advance of the extension . ·
of. or operate as a claim of territorial rights over
areas into \\'hich it thereafter may be deemed desirable to extend the trade."
'l,he lllue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co.
213 F 2d 355, 361 (1954) (Utah)
I>Iaintiff urges that the Sweet Sixteen Co. decision
reaches a contrary conclusion. However, the court here
1nerely found that the Plaintiff 'vas already in the
1narket because of daily advertisements for some t\vo
years in 7 5 different newspapers circulated daily in Salt
Lake l'~ i ty, prior distribution of 1500 printed catalogs
in lTtah, 6-8 Inail order sales, distribution of suppleInental pictures and drawings, negotiations for store
lease. tuany actual cases of confusion, and telegraphic
notification of the conflict four days prior to the registration:
··... defendants assumed this name with full
kno,vledge of its use by plaintiff ... " (p. 921)
Results similar to those in the National Grocery
l·ase. were reached by the '\r ashington Court in the Eastern Outfitting case "~here Seattle and Spokane were
held to constitute different markets:
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" . . . his protection is co-extensive \\'ith his
market. 'The doctrine of unfair competition is
based upon the principle of common busines~
integrity, and equity only affords relief lvhen this
principle has been violated. . . . The mischief
' T hich a court of equity \vill guard against is a
confusion in names or in the identity of the parties or in the goods sold so as to deceive the public
and work a fraud upon the party having a right
to the trade name. There cannot be unfair trade
competition unless there is competition."
Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, et. al.
110 p. 23,24 (Washington)
The Massachusetts Court found that various stores
as close as sixteen miles apart were in different trade
areas:
"The trade name and symbols of the plaintiff
cannot extend into regions where his goods are
not sold, where he has no customers, and "'here
he has no trade. There can be no recovery unless
it appears that there has been a wrongful appropriation by defendant. . . . Actual or probable
deception of the public . . . is the basis of the
action. 'There can be no unfair competition unless
plaintiff is in fact a rival for the trade which
defendant secures."
Kaufman v. Kaufman
Ill NE 691, 692, (1916) (Massachusetts)
See also Good Housekeeping Shop v. Smitten, et. al.
236
872 (Michigan)

N''r

Nims points out that the determination of geographic boundaries of protection is a question of fact
rather than law.
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"\ rhile the concept of good-\vill has becoine less
t•loscly confined territorially, it still has boundarit's, and even under tnodern doctrine it is necessary that there be evidence of its existence to
\raiTant its protection. Its extent is a question of
faet rather than of la\v."
~ ims, l nfair Competition
and '11 rade
J/ arksJ 4th Ed., Sec. 35 (a), p. 150
T

In the Kauftnan case the court said:

''It does not seen1 easy to infer that 1nen would
travel sixteen to seventy-three miles ... for a
hat." ( p. 692)
Sinularly in the case at bar, not only is evidence
of existing confusion or competition lacking but it is
difficult to infer that wo1nen in the future would travel
164 1niles round trip from Ogden to Provo for a hairdo.
l".

X atu1·e and Use of

~lark

Plaintiff attempts to draw distinction on basis of
"'fechnical trade n1ark" as opposed to common-law
Inark. However, the court in the Sweet Sixteen case
stated the accepted rule:
··It is \veil settled that, both in cases of unfair
co1npetition unaccompanied with trade mark infringeinent, and in cases of infringement of technical or common-law trade marks, the essence of
the ,,·rang consists in the sale or mistaking of
goods of one dealer or manufacturer for those of
another." ( P. 9:25).
Defendant denies any penetration by Plaintiff into
Davis or \\'eber Counties prior to critical date of June
:!, 1961 ('fr. 89, 13~, 160-170). There was no confusion
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or competition in fact ( Tr. 80, 81, 93, 135). Neither \\'as
there any evidence of "free ride" or "palming off."
D.

Knowledge of Plaintiffs' N arne by Defendant

In the present case Defendant did not know of
Plaintiffs' existence at time of adoption of Defendant's
name ( Tr. 41, 42, 51, 97, 184, 185, 186) or subsequently
until after good will and "Secondary Meaning" were
established. 'The Court, as trier of fact, so determined.
(R. 12, 14)
The court in the Sweet Sixteen case clearly found
that defendant had actual notice of plaintiff four days
before registration issued. (p. 921) It should also be
noted that Defendant in the Sweet Sixteen case had not
established any good will or secondary meaning in the
name prior to Plaintiffs' entering the "market."
E.

Estoppel

Although the doctrine of estoppel might properly
be urged, it is not essential to Defendant's case.
Although Plaintiffs might have registered their
name as early as 1959, and pre-empted the entire state,
they failed to do so. 'l"hey should be estopped on theory
of Hanover Star Milling case from asserting their unprotected claim after defendant has developed "Secondary Meaning" and "good will" at substantial expense:
" ... they must be held to have taken the risk
that some innocent party 1night ... hit upon the
same mark and expend money and effort in building up a trade. . . . And when it appears, as it
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does, that Ilano,·er Cotnpany in good faith, and
\rithout notice . . . bus expended much n1oney
and effort in building up its trade ... Allen &
\ \rheeler C,on1pany is estopped to assert trade
1nnrk infringement as to that territory.'' (p. 419)
1~,.

Extension of

Plaintiffs' Rights

""Throughout

Utah''
I>Iaintiffs admit that the rule that cormnon-law
rights are co-extensive 'vith state boundaries was criticized by the tnajority opinion (p. 416) in the Hanover
l'ase ... and has not been generally regarded with favor
hy scholars in the field of trademark la"··" ( Pl. Br. 12)
See also:

a llestaten1ent of ,.l,or, Sec. 732, Cotnrnent
a., supra.
X ational Grocery Co. v. National Stores
l"orp., supra.
Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, et. al.,
supra.
l~auf1nan ,~.

Kaufman, supra.

Good Housekeeping Shop Y. Smitten, et. al.,
supra.
'!'he facts of the case at bar show no competition
or confusion between Plaintiffs and Defendant north
of Salt Lake County on June 2, 1961, and substantially
no penetration of any kind by Plaintiffs into northern

Utah.
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G.

I-Ioldings of Other Courts

Cases cited by Plaintiffs as broadening territorial
rights are distinguishable either on basis of intentional
appropriation for free ride, bad fait~ of the lateco1ner.
or deception of public due to actual confusion of source.

II
COMPE,-fiTION REMAINS TilE ESSENCE OF A TRADEMARK, TRADENAME
OR UNFAIR COMPETITION SUIT A1,
COMMON LAW.
Although some courts have used language suggesting competition is no longer necessary, such is not the
law of the land.

J

Laws of "Unfair Competition," common la"T and
statutory, were designed to free competition from abuses, still recognizing that: "Liberty to compete should
guarantee the rewards to those who could survive by
reason of economic fitness and superior merit in productive and selling efficiency."
Oppenheim, Cases on Unfair Co1npetition-'Trade
Regulation ( 1948 Ed.), p. 10
See Defendants Trial Court Brief, p. 8-9, for historical summary.
In the Eastern 'Vine Corp. case, Judge F.,rank
succinctly states the law:
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··'rhe failure to keep constantly in 1nind the
divers poliey t·onsiderations ... and the conse<t uen t oceasional over-e1nphasis on but one of
the1n- the protection of the interest of the businesstnnn 'vho has built a business around a name
-has someti1nes led to decisions unduly extending the confines of name-monopolies. For a time
the courts were remarkably generous in fixing the
boundaries of such monopolies. Today the tendcnclJ is to be somewhat less generous . ... We
approach the case at barJ thenJ having in mind
the basic com1non-law policy of encouraging competition and the fact the protection of monopolies
in names is but a secondary and limiting factor.n
Eastern ''rine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren,
Ltd.
137 ~_, 2d 955, 959 (CCA 2d, 1953)
Cert. Denied; 320 US 758
~,or

critical analysis of opinions see Zlinkoff: Monolopy ,~. Competition: 53 Yale Law Journal 514, 528552 (1944). Zlinkoff says in 53 Yale Law Journal:
''The trend of decisions within this field . . . in
contrast to that prevailing in a previous periodhas unmistakable been moving toward restricting
the scope of exclusive rights awarded plaintiffs
and corresponding broadening the privileges of
their competitors." ( p. 531) .
Zlinkoff also attacks the more liberal expressions
of ("allman, as not reflecting the law:
,.... decisional trends have not been influenced
by writers like Callman because, in their advocacy
of greater recognition of exclusive rights in
tnarks ... they have overlooked the interests of
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the public, and the view that free competition best
advances those interests." (p. 529)
Similarly, in the National Grocery Co. case the
court said:
"Of course, their must be actual competition
before there can be any unfair competition."
(p. 74)
Similar law is pronounced in Eastern Outfitting
Co. case (p. 24), and Kaufman case (p. 692) quoted
previously.
Although Judge Learned Hand has been often
quoted as authority for decisions not relying on "conipetition," he has on several occasions noted that irrespective of the language used, the essential element remains
competition:
''The law of unfair trade comes down very
nearly to this - as judges have repeated again
and again- that one merchant shall not divert
customers from another by representing what he
sells as emanating from the second. This has been,
and perhaps even more now is, the whole Law
and the Prophets on the subject, though it as. ''
sumes many guises.
Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson
26 F 2d 972, 973 ( CCA 2, 1928)
See also:
Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden Condensed
Milk Co.
201 F 2d 510, 514 (CCA 7, 1912)
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'1,1
. 1crc l'all lJc no pass1ng o ff , " "free-r1'd e, ,, or confusion ot' source except in the area of \cotnpetitive business.
44

•

4

l~ertninly

the Utah Supren1e Court recognized this
in its decision in the Blue 13ell cases in refusing to recognize Hn1nrket of future expansion." (p. 361)

Ill
J>J~i\l~'riFFS'

l~URPOR'fED

U'fAH
S'f.i\'fE It~:GIS'l,RATION 0}, THE TR..t\.DE~1 .i\ It I~
Oll 'l,RADEN AME " MADEMOIs~:LLE" FOl-t BEALTTY SALON BUSINESS
'rHROlT(~HOTJ'l, '1'HE S'f . c\.TE OF U'l,AH IS
IX\"ALID.
4

Ad1nittedly, the Utah act provides that Registration ... shall constitute prima-facie evidence of exclusive
o\vnership ( lTtah Code Annotated, 70-3-5).
Defendant clearly overcame Plaintiffs' "prima
facie" ease for exclusive ownership. (R. 8, 12, 14, Tr.
41-46)

lTtah Code Annotated, Section 70-3-2 forbids registration of a 1nark "used in this state by another and not
abandoned":
h70-:J-:?: 1'rade Jl arks and Service Marks

not to

be Registered JVhen: A trade mark or service
Inark shall not be registered if it ...

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6. Consists of or comprises a trade mark or

service mark registered in this state or a trade
mark, trade name or service mark previously
used in this state by another and not abandoned
as to be likely when applied to the goods and services of the applicant to cause confusion or mistake
.
an d to dece1ve.
. . . ''
The evidence clearly shows that Defendant's use
was previous to this purported registration and had not
been abandoned.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 70-3-10 provides
for cancellation if found:
"2.b. That the registrant is not the owner of the
trade mark or service mark.
c. That the registration was granted improperly.
3. When a court of competent jurisdiction shall
order cancellation of a registration on any
groun d ."
'l.,he evidence clearly shows not only that the Registrant was not the owner of the trade name in
eber
County or North Davis County (R. 8, 12, 14, Tr. 41-46),
but that he knew of Defendant's use of the name at the
time of filing for registration (Tr. 30, 73, 74, 75, 179,

''T

186).

Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70-3-15 provides:
"Common-law trade marks or service marksNothing herein shall adversely affect the rights
and the enforcement of rights in trade marks or
service marks acquired in good faith_, at any time
at comrnon-law.""
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Defendant's common-law rights were acquired in
good faith in a trade area not cormnon to Plaintiffs on
June 2. 1961, and prior to Plaintiffs' registration ( R.
8, 1:?. 1~, 'fr. 41, -1:2,51, 97, 185).
Bused upon the conceded facts, the only argument
to controvert Defendant's common-law right prior to
.June 2, 1961, is based upon "prior use" by Plaintiffs.
Such argument must fail because of the difference in
"trade area" previously discussed.
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70-3-3- ( 4) requires
a registration affidavit verified by applicant including
among other things:
H

(

4) A statement that the applicant is the owner

of the trade 1nark or service mark and that no
other person has the 1·ight to use such trade mark
or service mark either in the identical form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as might
be calculated to deceive or to be mistaken therefore in this state.n
Existence of Secondary Meaning and right of user
established by Defendant in Weber and north Davis
Counties prior to June 2, 1961 (R. 8, 12, 14) necessarily
renders affidavit required of Plaintiffs as condition precedent to regist1·ation "false," thus invalidating any purported registration per Section 70-3-2-6, supra.
Thus the court in the Sweet Sixteen case set aside
defendant's l~tah State Registration on basis of prior
conunon-lu"~ rights of Plaintiff. (p. 921, 925)
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The requirement of accurate affidavit is the ,·ery
graveman of gaining rights under Section 70, '"hich
permits registration on affidavit alone, without notice,
advertisements, proof or other process. Certainly, a
Plaintiff with unclean hands, knowing of Defendant's
use of the name, and intending to deprive Defendant
of such value as Defendant has created, may not falsely
aver exclusive ownership and right "within the State of
Utah," and thereby gain a right or priority not available
without such registration.

IV
DEFENDAN'l' IS ENTI'l'LED '1'0 RECOVER HIS DAMAGES RESUL'l'ING FROl\1
FALSE ASSERTION OF WILLIAM GARTH
SEEGMILLER
MADE
TO
PROCURE
TRADENAME REGISTRATION.
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70-3-12, provides:
"70-3-12: False or fraudtttlenJ reproduction or
declarat~on

in registration - Liability for damages: Any~person who shall for himself or on
behalf of any other person procure the filing and
registration of any trade mark or service mark in
the office of the secretary of state under the provisions hereof by knowingly making any false
or fraudulent representation or declaration, verbally or in writing or by any other fraudulent
means, shall be liable to pay all damages sustained in consequency of such filing or registration, to be recovered by or on behalf of the party
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iujurcd thereby iu any court of competent jurisdiction.''
l,laintiil's' atl'idaYit for registration verifies that:
··... no other person has the right to use such
trade 1nark or service mark ... in this state."
(Exhibit~)

Such affidavit "·as made by Plaintiff with knowledge of l)efendant's use and name ( Tr. 30, 73, 7 ~, 75,
17H. 18{)). Such state1nent '"as "false" because of Defendant's established conunon-law trade name in the trade
area of \\r eber and north Davis Counties at the ti1ne
of the affidavit (R. 8, 12, I~). Such false statement was
n1ade for the a<hnitted purpose of interfering with Defendant's business use of the name ''Mademoiselle"
('l'r. 7.>). 'fhe false statement and subsequent improper
registration did in fact result in damage to Defendant
in that he has been required to retain counsel to resist
this action and set aside the purported registration.
Plaintiff, consequently should be required to pay all
l'osts and datnages sustair1ed by Defendant.
In all othe1· respects the judgment and findings of
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectively submitted,
\\rALLACE R. WOODBCRY
711 East on South Temple
Salt Lake City. Utah
EM ~-4321
. .-\.ttorney for Defendant-Respondent
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